Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities: Profit Maximization, Corporate Scope, and Profit margins by Levinthal, Daniel A & Wu, Brian
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
7-2010
Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free
Capabilities: Profit Maximization, Corporate
Scope, and Profit margins
Daniel A. Levinthal
University of Pennsylvania
Brian Wu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/26
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Levinthal, D. A., & Wu, B. (2010). Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities: Profit Maximization, Corporate Scope, and
Profit margins. Strategic Management Journal, 31 (7), 780-780. http://dx.doi.org/801
Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities: Profit Maximization,
Corporate Scope, and Profit margins
Abstract
The resource-based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose (1959), has focused primarily on the
fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction between scale free capabilities
and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting
the discourse back to Penrose's (1959) original argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities.
The existence of resources and capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit-
maximizing diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or
another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits
and profit margins. Firms make profit-maximizing decisions to increase total profit via diversification when
the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively mature. Due to the spreading of these
capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profit-maximizing diversification actions lead to
total profit growth but lower average returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical
observations regarding the diversification discount. The self-selection effect noted in recent work in corporate
finance may not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity
contexts in which these firms are operating.
Keywords
corporate diversification, firm capabilities, opportunity cost, diversification discount, industry dynamics,
resource-based view of the firm
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/26
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426071
Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities:  Profit Maximization, 
Corporate Scope, and Profit Margins  
 
Daniel A. Levinthal* 
Reginald H. Jones Professor of Corporate Strategy 
3209 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370 
215-898-6826 (phone) 
215-573-8602 (fax) 
dlev@wharton.upenn.edu 
Brian Wu 
Assistant Professor of Strategy 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business 
University of Michigan 
701 Tappan Street, R4388 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 
734-647-9542 (phone) 
734-764-2555 (fax) 
wux@umich.edu 
 
 
Forthcoming in Strategic Management Journal 
 
 
 
August 2009 
* Corresponding author 
We wish to thank the Mack Center for Emerging Technologies for generously supporting this 
research. We have benefited from comments on prior drafts by Ron Adner, David Collis, Glenn 
MacDonald, Costas Markides, Nicolaj Siggelkow, Harbir Singh, Sid Winter, the associate editor 
Joseph Mahoney, and two anonymous referees, as well as seminar audiences at the Tuck School, 
Dartmouth College, the Atlanta Competitive Advantage Conference, the Academy of 
Management, and the Harvard Strategy Conference.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426071
 
 
 
2
Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities: Profit Maximization, Corporate Scope, 
and Profit Margins  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The resource-based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose (1959), has focused 
primarily on the fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction 
between scale-free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be 
allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting the discourse back to Penrose’s (1959) original 
argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities. The existence of resources and 
capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit-maximizing 
diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or 
another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between 
total profits and profit margins. Firms make profit-maximizing decisions to increase total profit 
via diversification when the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively 
mature. Due to the spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that 
firms' profit-maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average 
returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical observations regarding the 
diversification discount. The self-selection effect noted in recent work in corporate finance may 
not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity 
contexts in which these firms are operating.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The resource-based view of the firm has long recognized that firms diversify in order to 
exploit firm-specific resources1 for which factor markets are imperfect (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 
1982). As Mahoney and Pandian (1992) note, this argument is based both upon the availability 
of resources, in particular the degree to which there may be slack resources in the firm’s current 
market context, as well as implications of the nature of the firm’s resources for the direction of 
possible diversification efforts. The diversification literature along the lines of the resource-based 
view has largely focused on this latter point highlighting the fungibility of resources, or the 
degree to which the value of resources may be diminished as resources are leveraged in settings 
more distant from the original context in which the resource (e.g., brand-name or technical 
capability) was developed (cf., Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). The fungibility of resources 
is the basis for the explanation as to why related diversification tends to outperform unrelated 
diversifications and, in turn, why firms tend to pursue more related diversifications (Bettis, 1981; 
Markides and Williamson, 1994; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Robins and Wiersema, 
1995; Rumelt, 1974).2  
Implicitly, and at times explicitly, resources are often treated as having a scale-free 
property in the sense that the value of resources is assumed to be not reduced as a result of the 
sheer magnitude of firm operations over which they are applied. As Chang (1995: 387) notes, 
“The dominant view in diversification research is that intangible resources, such as technology 
and marketing skills, encourage firms to diversify into new businesses in order to exploit the 
‘public goods’ nature of information-intensive assets.” However, as argued in Penrose (1959), 
                                                 
1 “Resources” and “capabilities” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
2  It is also important to note that owning a more fungible resource does not necessarily lead to competitive 
advantage, since it might be in more abundant supply (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) or attract more 
competition (Adner and Zemsky, 2008). 
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the stock of a firm's resources and the degree to which they are fungible across product markets 
are both critical in determining diversification decisions. Many of the resources that may 
underpin a firm’s diversification efforts, such as an effective management team or product 
development expertise in a particular domain, have the feature that they are subject to 
opportunity costs. At any point in time, these resources must be allocated among alternative 
activities, and the use of these resources in one activity precludes their use in other settings. 
While some resources, such as a brand name or patent, may have a public good-like quality, 
most firm resources or capabilities do not.3 The most familiar example in the business setting is a 
firm-specific management team (Slater, 1980). While a superior management team can improve 
the productivities across all segments, the team also has to allocate its limited time and attention 
(Rosen, 1982).  
This issue of the need to allocate capabilities across markets and, as a consequence, the 
linking of diversification efforts to demand conditions in alternative markets is highlighted by 
Chandler (1969), which maintains that it was the decline in product market activity in the late 
1920s and the 1930s that precipitated the enormous growth in diversification of industrial firms 
in the U.S. Chandler (1969: 275) submits that firms such as DuPont and General Electric that 
“had accumulated vast resources in skilled manpower, facilities, and equipment” were under 
great pressure to find new markets as their existing ones ceased to grow.  
More generally, as Mahoney and Pandian (1992) point out, there is an important line of 
inquiry running from Uzawa (1969), Chandler (1969; 1977), Rubin (1973), Slater (1980), and 
Teece (1982) that takes onboard Penrose’s (1959) concern for the dynamics of resource 
accumulation by the firm and the implications of these dynamics for diversification efforts. In a 
                                                 
3 Even a resource such as a brand name may not be a pure public good as the application of a brand name for one 
product might impact its value in another. Thus, when Gucci wildly applied its brand name to a number of lower-
end products in the 1980s, the value of the brand was argued to have been reduced (Aaker, 2004).  
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similar vein, Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) suggest that firms may reallocate resources across 
domains over time in order to achieve, what they term, inter-temporal scope economies. 
However, the research literature has not been clear about the distinction between scale-
free capabilities and those capabilities that must be allocated among alternative uses. This 
distinction is critical because we believe that it is this latter class of capabilities that capture the 
essence of Penrose’s (1959) arguments regarding diversification. If capabilities are all scale-free, 
as is often implicitly assumed in the literature, issues of opportunity costs and resource allocation 
are inconsequential, since scale-free capabilities can always be leveraged in other areas and 
hence will always have “excess” capacity. Thus, it is only resources subject to an opportunity 
cost that affect how resources should optimally be allocated.  
In this sense, we are making an analytical return to the original sensibility of Penrose’s 
(1959) capability-based perspective on diversification. However, it is important to note that 
Penrose (1959) focused on the limit case in which firms had “excess” capabilities. This excess 
derives from two possible sources. One stems from the fact that some resources constitute 
discrete investments, such as a physical plant. If a manufacturing facility is not being fully 
utilized in the production of the firm’s current products, then such a facility can be a free 
resource that can be applied, in part, to other means. The other source results from managerial 
learning, which enables a given managerial team to handle a greater range of responsibilities 
over time. Yet, resources, particularly human capital-based resources, tend to be fully allocated 
to particular tasks and initiatives at any point in time. In that sense, such resources are not in 
“excess.” However, there still remains the question of what is the best allocation of the time of a 
sales force, product development team, or top management group based on their opportunity 
costs.  
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In addition to extending Penrose’s (1959) notion of excess resources to the more general 
notion of opportunity cost, we incorporate a greater consideration of the role of the demand 
environment in influencing the opportunity costs associated with a firm’s resources. The 
emphasis in Penrose’s (1959) work was on the internal growth of resources as the source of 
excess capacity in the context of demand environment that is implicitly assumed to be static. We 
examine how the dynamics of the demand environment influence the allocation of a firm’s 
resources, its diversification efforts, and measures of performance. Specifically, since the criteria 
of carrying out an activity are based upon the opportunity cost of applying capabilities in one 
domain or another (Rubin, 1973; Slater, 1980), a complete account of excess capacity of 
capabilities should take into account not only internal growth in firm-specific capabilities but 
also the change in external opportunities across different markets. Underutilized capacity 
becomes available when the growth opportunities in the current market cannot keep pace with 
the internal growth of capabilities. The maturity of the current market relative to other potential 
markets could either reduce the value of applying non-scale free capabilities in the current 
market or raise the opportunity cost of not applying some of these capabilities in related product 
markets.4 It is in this sense that resources become “underutilized” or “excess.” Alternatively, if 
the current market continues to offer sufficiently favorable opportunities, it will not be 
economically rational to divert non-scale free resources into other industries as long as there is 
any imperfect fungibility in the value of capabilities when applied to other domains.  
Building on these issues concerning firms’ internal resource base and their external 
product market environment, we develop a basic economic model that provides a rational 
                                                 
4 The relative maturity of the current market could arise either from the decline of the current market or from the fast 
growth of other markets. An example of the former case is the defense industry after the mid-1980s (Anand and 
Singh, 1997), while an example of the latter case is the mature desktop PC market in comparison with the rapidly 
growing hand-held device market. 
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explanation of firms’ diversification behavior in trading off profit margins for corporate growth. 
Largely ignored by the research literature is the fact that profit-maximizing diversification 
decisions imply that firms seek to increase total profit but not necessarily their profit margin or 
market-to-book value, with the latter two measures being among the more common performance 
measures used in the diversification literature (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). Firms make 
rational decisions to increase total profit via diversification when the industries in which they are 
currently competing become relatively mature. In this process, however, firms need to allocate 
their non-scale free resources away from the current business to the new one. Due to the 
spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profit-
maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average returns. In a 
similar vein, Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) show that a wider level of diversification can 
lead to lower average rents (Tobin’s q) due to the imperfect fungibility of firm-specific factors. 
We find that the decline in average returns may arise from the reallocation of capabilities to new 
product markets, even in the absence of any imperfect fungibility of firm-specific capabilities. 
We first examine this model in a simple Bertrand set-up in which we demonstrate the 
basic result regarding the implication of profit maximizing diversification on profit margins. We 
then expand this to a Cournot model that allows for a more explicit treatment of competition. In 
the Cournot setting, we can generate cross-sectional results in which a firm with inferior 
capabilities remains focused on a single product market and earns higher profit margins, but less 
profit, than its more capable competitor. We also find that as firms become more asymmetric in 
their capabilities, the necessary size of the new product market to elicit diversification on the part 
of the more capable firm rises. With greater asymmetry in capabilities, the original market in 
which both firms compete becomes more attractive, thereby diminishing the incentive to 
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diversify. Thus, the Cournot results allow us to expand the considerations of competitive effects 
and also demonstrate the robustness of our original results to those effects.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section further develops the 
notion of non-scale free capabilities that must be allocated among alternative uses and its 
contrast with scale-free capabilities. We then set up and analyze the formal model by linking 
capability-based arguments regarding diversification and the demand conditions in the markets 
in which the firm does and may participate. After developing some general results under 
Bertrand and Cournot competition for the relationship among diversification decisions, firms’ 
capabilities, and profit margins, we engage in a numeric analysis of the Cournot model to further 
develop the implications of competitive forces on both diversification decisions and profit 
margins. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of these results. 
 
OPPORTUNITY COST AND DIVERSIFICATION 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 1 illustrates the contrast between what we term scale-free capabilities and those 
resources that are congestible and require allocation to distinct purposes. In addition to this 
dimension by which capabilities may differ, there is the more traditional issue of fungibility, or 
the range of activities over which a resource or capability may be applied. The most restricted 
sort of resources resides in the lower left cell. Highly specific human or physical capital not only 
has the property that its specificity narrows the domain of activities over which the resource can 
be applied, but also that its use in one activity constrains its possible use in other activities. The 
cell in the upper left again offers human and physical capital examples, but in this case the 
capital is applicable over a wider domain of activities. While an auditor may not be usefully 
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applied in a marketing function, he or she can apply their auditing expertise to a wide variety of 
enterprises. Similarly, power generation equipment is a general purpose capital infrastructure 
that could be applied to an enormous range of uses. However, per the issue of opportunity cost, it 
is important to note that the use of an auditor in one engagement restricts their possible use in 
another; and the application of a certain magnitude of kilowatts to one purpose reduces the 
kilowatts available for another. In the right-hand side, the resources are not subject to 
opportunity cost. There are no inherent constraints on how many goods or services can bear a 
common brand name. Nor does the use of a computer program on one machine preclude its use 
on another.5 While the fungibility of a brand name or computer operating system is not limitless, 
the range of application is generally greater than either a specific piece of intellectual property or 
the range of uses of a particular customer relationship.  
The extant research literature on diversification has tended to focus on scale-free 
capabilities, such as technical know-how and reputation, which lead to economies of scope or 
synergies in the diversification process because they “display some of the characteristics of a 
public good in that it may be used in many different non-competing applications without its 
value in any one application being substantially impaired” (Teece, 1980: 226). The recognition 
of scale-free capabilities has had a profound influence on both academic research and industry 
practice, since it highlights the role of knowledge and competence as strategic assets (Winter, 
1987). Winter and Szulanski’s (2001) study of replication processes provides a paradigmatic 
example of a scale-free capability, defining the Arrow core as the informational endowment a 
firm extracts from an original setting which can be replicated to other settings. The distinctive 
property of such information-like resource is that “unlike any resource that is rivalrous in use, an 
                                                 
5 The producer may restrict the replication of the program through site licenses or copy restrictions but clearly such 
constraints are to address issues of value appropriation and are not related to technological constraints to the 
application of a given program to multiple applications.  
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information-like resource is infinitely leverageable…it does not have to be withdrawn from one 
use to be applied to another” (Winter and Szulanski, 2001: 741). 
The critical constraint in the application of scale-free resources is not by definition the 
scale of the operations over which they are applied, but rather the scope or range of their 
applicability. Indeed, the issue of resource relatedness and fungibility is arguably the most 
studied question in corporate strategy. Rumelt (1974), in a pioneering examination of this issue, 
showed that firms pursuing related diversifications outperform those pursuing a strategy of 
unrelated diversification. This basic finding has been reconsidered with a variety of different 
measures of relatedness, but the general result has stood up (Bettis, 1981; Markides and 
Williamson, 1994; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Robins and Wiersema, 1995).  
While Penrose’s (1959) emphasis on a firm’s stock of capabilities as a basis for 
diversification has played a secondary role to the consideration of the fungibility of resources, 
there has been some awareness in the literature that there may be opportunity costs associated 
with the use of resources. In his brief discussion on the limits to diversification economies, Teece 
(1982: 53) suggests that, “Know-how is generally not embodied in blueprints alone; the human 
factor is critically important in technology transfer. Accordingly, as the demands for sharing 
know-how increase, bottlenecks in the form of over-extended scientists, engineers, and managers 
can be anticipated.” Recent empirical work in both finance and management has provided 
suggestive evidence of the opportunity cost of allocating resources from one product domain to 
another. Schoar (2002) finds that after a firm diversifies into a new industry by acquiring a plant, 
the incumbent plants will incur a decrease in productivity, while the acquired plants increase 
productivity. Similarly, Roberts and McEvily (2005) find that entering a new pharmaceutical 
product market reduces a firm’s performance in its current markets. Finally, Hitt et al. (1991: 
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695) observe that acquisitions tend to reduce both the extent and productivity of firms’ R&D 
investments, suggesting that the “resources remaining for managerial allocation may become 
constrained, causing managers to forgo other investment opportunities.” 
Consider the following example of these arguments. As the strongest player in the 
microprocessor industry, Intel has been experiencing sluggish growth in the PC microprocessor 
market due to saturated demand and increasing competition from Advanced Micro Devices. In 
order to spur growth, Intel has sought to extend its reach beyond the PC microprocessor industry 
into mobile phones and consumer electronics. The maturity of the PC microprocessor market has 
made the opportunities of using its capabilities in other industries more attractive, and, 
correspondingly, the opportunity cost of staying focused has risen. At the same time, 
diversification requires Intel to allocate its scarce resources into these new segments. 
Consequently, our theory would predict that, on the whole, Intel’s diversification efforts will 
increase sales and total profit. However, its average return will decline, reflecting both the 
shifting away of firm-specific resources from the development and manufacturing of 
microprocessors for PCs and the possible reduced efficacy of these same resources in the related 
product markets into which the firm is diversifying.6  
Based upon the above reasoning, we develop the following arguments regarding 
diversification efforts. First, it is important to distinguish between diversification efforts based on 
scale-free and non-scale free capabilities. A scale-free resource, such as brand name, faces limits 
on the breadth of its fungibility (i.e., how broadly fungible is a given brand name) but not on its 
extent of application (i.e., the number of markets in which a given brand can be applied for a 
given level of fungibility). In contrast, the application of those non-scale free capabilities is 
                                                 
6 Of course, another basis for the decline in average return is the shift from a market in which Intel has a dominant 
position to markets that may be more competitive; however, the fact that Intel is entering these more competitive, 
but more rapidly growing, markets is further testimony to the need to reallocate non-scale free capabilities.  
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driven by the logic of opportunity costs. On the margin, is the greatest value of these firm-
specific capabilities realized within the current product market context or in diversifying to a 
new context? This opportunity cost is, in turn, importantly affected by the size, growth, and 
competitive conditions in alternative product markets. Thus, when there are multiple segments, 
the range of diversification activity is constrained by the total stock of capabilities. This analysis 
supplements the insight in the strategy literature that the imperfect fungibility of scale-free 
capabilities restricts corporate scope (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988).  
This analysis also provides new insights into the diversification discount, the observation 
that diversified firms tend to have a lower valuation, typically measured as the relationship 
between market value to book value or Tobin’s q, than an amalgamation of an equivalent set of 
focused firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Agency theorists suggest that 
diversification destroys value for reasons such as managers’ empire building behavior that aims 
to increase their own status, power, and pecuniary compensation (e.g., Jensen, 1986). Recently, 
however, there has been a growing literature in the corporate finance field suggesting that a 
diversification discount arises even when firms are value maximizers. Econometrically 
sophisticated analyses of the profitability of diversified firms (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002; 
Villalonga, 2004) indicate that there is something systematically different about firms that 
diversify. It is this endogenous selection into the act of diversification, rather than diversification 
per se, that leads to diversification discount:  
“… the failure to control for firm characteristics that lead firms to diversify and be 
discounted may wrongly attribute the discount to diversification instead of the underlying 
characteristics. For example, consider a firm facing technological change, which 
adversely affects its competitive advantage in its industry. This poorly performing firm 
will trade at a discount relative to other firms in the industry. Such a firm will also have 
lower opportunity costs of assigning its scarce resources in other industries, and this 
might lead it to diversify. If poorly performing firms tend to diversify, then not taking 
into account past performance and its effect on the decision to diversify will result in 
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attributing the discount to diversification activity, rather than to the poor performance of 
the firm.” (Campa and Kedia, 2002: 1732) 
 
In existing analytical explanations of this empirical finding that, controlling for 
endogeniety in diversification behavior, there is no diversification discount (e.g., Gomes and 
Livdan, 2004), the act of diversification is interpreted as a “signal” that the firm has relatively 
few ex-ante capabilities and is diversifying due to the correspondingly low rates of return in its 
initial markets. In the presence of diminishing returns to production, firms with lower 
productivity will reach their optimal size in the incumbent segment at a lower size level than 
those firms with higher productivity and, as a result, firms with lower productivity are more 
likely to diversify.  
We agree with these recent empirical findings that there is something systematic about 
those firms that “sort” themselves into a positive diversification decision. However, the above 
analytical explanation is not fully consistent with the well-evidenced proposition in the strategy 
field that firms with more relevant capabilities (R&D or marketing capabilities) tend to enter a 
new field earlier and perform better (e.g., Helfat, 2003; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Mitchell, 
1989). In contrast, in the spirit of the long-standing treatment of diversification in the strategy 
literature, we suggest that the “something different” is not that these firms are a “bad type” and 
are lacking in capabilities. Rather, these are firms with relatively superior capabilities; and the 
bad “signal” may be a statement about the market contexts in which these firms are operating, 
such as demand maturity, rather than a statement about the firm’s relative lack of capabilities.7 In 
the pursuit of the best use of the firm’s non-scale free resources, there is some allocation of 
                                                 
7 The recent treatments of the diversification discount such as Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) do 
control for industry demand conditions when examining the self-selection effect of the act of diversification on the 
so-called diversification discount. However, due to data limitations, such work must rely on measures of industry at 
the four-digit level of the SIC code. This level of aggregation masks considerable diversity of demand environments 
at the product level. We elaborate on this issue in the discussion section.  
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resources away from established markets and, at the sacrifice of profit margins but not total 
profits, a shift of these resources to new markets. Thus, both our model and those developed in 
the corporate finance literature are consistent with the empirical finding regarding the 
diversification “discount”; however, the two explanations differ in their predictions as to which 
firms (more or less capable) are likely to be more or less diversified.  
 
MODEL STRUCTURE 
We model a firm’s diversification decision with regard to two market segments indexed 
by m (The initial segment Im  and the new segment Nm  ). Production in each segment is 
described as mmmm TktQ  , where m  is the firm’s scale-free capabilities, mt is the share of the 
firm’s total non-scale free capabilities, T , that must be divided among activities, and capital mk  
whose replacement cost per unit is r  which reflects the current market value of capital. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assume that firms are endowed with a particular capability stock T and do 
not consider the cost of developing this, but only the opportunity cost of how it is applied across 
different market segments within the firm. The amount of mk  needed to produce mQ , given mt , is 
therefore 
Tt
Q
mm
m

, with total cost m m m
m m
rQ
c Q
t T
  , where 
 m
m m
r
c
t T
         (1) 
Note that (i) scale-free capabilities, m , and non-scale free capabilities, T , are firm 
specific and subject to imperfect input markets (Teece, 1982); (ii) providing more of capabilities 
reduces both total and marginal cost since it substitutes for the purchased capital; (iii) mc is 
decreasing in mt  and increases to infinity as mt  approaches zero; (iv) we specify the following 
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relationship between scale-free capabilities in the two markets: IN  )1(  . This relationship 
implies that scale-free capabilities, I , are not perfectly fungible, and that the effectiveness of 
scale-free capabilities, I , diminishes by a factor  ( 10   ) when I  is applied to the new 
segment N.8 
It is important to relate this production function and associated cost function to our 
underlying argument regarding scale-free and non-scale free capabilities. Our focus is on the 
allocation of non-scale-free capabilities across market contexts. This capability could be a 
product development team that might be spread across multiple initiatives, as highlighted in 
Christensen and Bower’s (1996) work on the disk drive industry, the allocation of scarce 
production capacity as in Burgleman’s (1994) work on Intel, or the attention of the top 
management team (Rosen, 1982). For the sake of simplicity, we are not addressing this 
allocation with respect to the scale of activity within a given business unit. Thus, a business unit 
is assumed to be able to scale up its activity at a constant marginal cost. This simplification 
follows on the works of Klepper (1996) and Lippman and Rumelt (1982) on industry evolution, 
which, in order to highlight the effect of across-firm heterogeneity, postulate a production 
technology with a constant marginal cost of production. This assumption of constant return to 
production scale also allows us to demonstrate that diversification can arise from the change in 
demand conditions in the absence of diminishing return to production scale, in contrast to recent 
work in corporate finance (cf., Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) in 
which diminishing returns to production scale acts as an underlying driver for diversification. 
                                                 
8 As we point out in Table 1, non-scale free capabilities are also subject to the issue of imperfect fungibility, but the 
distinctive feature of non-scale free capabilities is that they must be allocated across alternative uses based on 
opportunity costs. In order to highlight the issue of allocation, we assume that non-scale free capabilities are 
perfectly fungible; however, so that the model more closely corresponds to Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), we 
allow for the scale-free capability to have imperfect fungibility across alternative uses. 
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We denote the demand and price for a given firm’s product in segment m  as mq  and mp  
respectively. Should the firm engage in both activities, its profit is ( ) ( )I I I N N Nq p c q p c   or 
( ) ( )I I N N
I I N N
r r
q p q p
t T t T 
   . Assuming the optimal It  and Nt  are both strictly positive, the 
firm’s problem is: 
  max{( ) ( ) | 1, , and }NII I N N I N N I
I I N N N N I I
qq r r
p q p q r t t p p
t T t T t T t T   
         (2) 
Note that it may not be optimal for the firm to engage in both activities simultaneously. 
Furthermore, if it is optimal for the firm to be diversified into both activities, then the optimal 
allocations of non-scale-free capabilities *It  and 
*
Nt  are bounded away from zero. That is, to get 
into the new activity requires a discrete reduction in the capabilities employed in the initial 
activity. Indeed, depending on the magnitude of the firm’s capabilities and the market price, a 
firm may not be competitively viable in a given market. 
 This above setting offers a general framework for analyzing firms’ diversification 
decisions and the associated performance effects based on (non-scale-free) capability allocation. 
In the following sections, we examine the diversification problem characterized in this general 
framework using the two most widely used market models: the Bertrand model and the Cournot 
model, which usefully complement each other. The Bertrand analysis allows us to develop the 
basic insights regarding the allocation of scarce capabilities across lines of business and its 
implications for firm profitability. Introducing Cournot competition allows us to examine more 
directly the impact of competitive interaction among firms. However, the Cournot analysis in 
this context does not lend itself to a full closed form analytical solution as the reaction functions 
are neither continuous nor monotonic. Thus, we analytically derive the general results regarding 
firm diversification decisions, and then perform a numerical analysis to characterize more 
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specific properties regarding profit margins and the pattern of diversification. Further, we 
analyze a wide array of parameter values to both explore further insights of the model and the 
robustness of our results.  
 
ANALYSIS: Bertrand Model 
Each market is specified to be a Bertrand duopoly, where whenever the firm allocates 
non-scale-free capabilities such that its marginal cost is lower than that of the competitor, the 
firm serves the whole market with demand. The demand side of segment m  consists of 
ms consumers. Thus, the firm that captures the market produces quantity m mq s , charges a price 
of mp equal to the competitor’s marginal cost, and has profits ( )m m ms p c , where m
m m
r
c
t T
  is 
defined as in equation (1).  
In this Bertrand setting, a given firm diversifies into the new segment when demand 
conditions are such that the maximization problem (2) has an interior solution * *( , )I Nt t . The total 
profit associated with the diversification strategy is 
* *
( ) ( )I I N N
I I N N
r r
s p s p
t T t T 
   , andthe total 
sales associated with the diversification strategy is I I N Np s p s . Therefore, the profit margin 
associated with the diversification strategy, which we denote as * , is 
 *
* *
( ) ( )
(1 )
NI
I N
I I N N I I I I N N I N
ss r r
p p
p s p s Tt p s p s Tt

  
   
  
   (3) 
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In contrast, when firms focus on the initial segment, the profit margin is 
II
I
II
sp
T
r
ps )(


, 
while when firms focus on the new segment the profit margin is 
NN
I
NN
sp
T
r
ps )
)1(
(


. 
Therefore, the weighted average of the profit margin of the two focus strategies, which we 
denote as w , with relative sales 
NNII
II
spsp
sp

and
NNII
NN
spsp
sp

 as the respective weights, is 
( ) ( )
(1 )
w NI
I N
I I N N I I I N N I
ss r r
p p
p s p s T p s p s T

  
   
  
    (4) 
w is a standard benchmark used to compare the performance of diversified and focused 
firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). The relation between the profit margin of 
the diversification strategy (equation (3)) and that of focused strategies (equation (4)) is 
characterized by equation (5). 
* 2
(1 )
I Nw
I I N N I
s s r
p s p s T
 
 
 
 
      (5) 
As a result, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The profit margin of the profit-maximizing diversification strategy for a firm with 
capability stock T is lower than the weighted average of the profit margin of focusing this 
capability stock T in each of the two markets. The difference is characterized by equation (5).  
(See Appendix 1 for a proof.) 
Proposition 1 allows us to identify the sources of the declining profit margin associated 
with diversification by decomposing the profit margin of the diversification strategy into two 
parts: the weighted average of the two focus strategies and the discount due to the spreading of 
non-scale-free capabilities. The second term of w in equation (4) indicates how the profit 
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margin of the diversification strategy declines with   the degree to which the effectiveness of 
scale-free capabilities diminishes in the new segment. This is the case studied in Montgomery 
and Wernerfelt (1988) who account for a decline in profit margin or Tobin’s q as firms apply, 
what we term, scale-free capabilities in increasingly distant markets.  
Adding to this consideration of imperfect fungibility, the second term of equation (5) 
captures the discount due to the spreading of non-scale-free capabilities. Therefore, equation (5) 
provides a more complete picture of the diversification discount from the resource-based view by 
incorporating the effect of non-scale-free resources that need to be allocated across applications. 
Proposition 1 suggests that the existence of a diversification discount does not necessarily result 
from agency behavior that deviates from profit maximization. The spreading of non-scale-free 
capabilities across more applications based on opportunity costs implies that the profit margin 
will be “sacrificed” to some extent in the pursuit of total profit maximization.  
In parallel to this discussion of the impact of diversification on the firm’s profit margins, 
we can also show that rational diversification efforts lead to lower Tobin’s q, a widely used 
measure in the empirical analysis of diversification performance. Given that there is no short-run 
variable production cost (e.g., depreciation and labor) in the model, the market value of the firm 
in this stylized one-period model can be represented by operating profit mm sp , which is the 
earnings stream that is generated from the firm’s capital stock of 
T
s
r
m
m

. Therefore, Tobin’s q, 
defined as the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of capital (Lindenberg 
and Ross, 1981; Winter, 1995), can be represented as m m
m
m
p s
q
s
r
T
 .     
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We denote the Tobin’s q associated with the diversification strategy as DIVq  and the 
Tobin’s q associated with the weighted average of two focused strategies as FOCq . Analogous to 
the relationship in equation (5), the ratio of FOCq and DIVq is  
2
11
1
I N
FOC
NDIV
I
s s
q
sq s


 

      
 (6) 
As a result, we have the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: The Tobin’s q of the profit-maximizing diversification strategy for a firm with 
capability stock T is lower than the weighted average of the Tobin’s q of focusing this capability 
stock T in each of the two markets. The difference, in ratio terms, is characterized by equation (6).  
(See Appendix 2 for a proof.) 
Therefore, whether the average return to capital is measured as economic profit margin 
(equation (5)) or as Tobin’s q (equation (6)), we see that profit-maximizing diversification leads 
to a reduction in these common measures of firm performance due to the spreading of firm 
resources over multiple product markets. 
 
ANALYSIS: Cournot Model  
The prior analysis examined the profit maximizing tradeoff between total profits and 
profit margins based on a Bertrand model. This analysis models the diversification of a focal 
firm that faces competitive constraints, but does not explicitly model an endogenous competitive 
process. In this section, we address this gap by introducing a model of Cournot competition. We 
develop this analysis using the same analytical structure for firms’ capabilities and their 
associated cost functions, but the Cournot structure requires us to more fully specify a demand 
function.  
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Demand in the initial market is specified as: 1 2( )I I I I Ip a b q q   , where 1 2 and I Iq q  are 
the output of firms 1 and 2 in the initial market. Similarly, in the new market, demand is: 
1 2( )N N N N Np a b q q   , where 1 2 and N Nq q  are the output of firms 1 and 2 in the new market. 
As before (equation (1)), firms are characterized by their non-scale-free 
capability 1 2 and T T , respectively. However, we set the value of scale-free capabilities  for the 
two competitors to be the same as we are focusing on the role of non-scale-free capabilities. The 
marginal production costs for firms 1 and 2 in market I and N are given by 1
1 1
1
I
I
c
t T
 , 
2
2 2
1
I
I
c
t T
 , 1
1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )N I
c
t T 

 
, and 2
2 2
1
(1 ) (1 )N I
c
t T 

 
, where 1It  and 2 It  are the 
fraction of non-scale-free capability of firms 1 and 2 invested on the initial market, respectively, 
and (1 )  is the effectiveness of scale-free capabilities,  , when   is applied to the new 
segment N ( 10   ). Thus, firms’ profits in each market are given by ( )im m im imp c q   , for 
1,2; ,i m I N  . 
The sequencing of the firms’ choice problem is that firms first choose their non-scale-free 
capability allocations, characterized by 1It and 2 It . Second, given the chosen 1It and 2 It , firms 
choose their production quantities 1 2and I Iq q  in the initial market and 1 2 and N Nq q  in the new 
market. The associated optimization problem can be well specified via backward induction. 
However, in this context, the problem does not lend itself to a general analytical solution. Indeed, 
we will show in the subsequent analysis that the best-response functions that underpin the 
equilibrium analysis may, in some cases, be non-continuous and non-monotonic.9  
                                                 
9 In this respect, it is worth noting that our model is related to but distinct from a classic IO model developed by 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), which showed that a two-stage model of production capacity investment followed by 
Bertrand price competition can be treated in a relatively straightforward manner as being equivalent to a one-stage 
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  The best response curves are not continuous for two reasons. First, the optimal 
allocations of non-scale-free capabilities are bounded away from zero, i.e., to get into the new 
activity requires a discrete reduction in the capabilities employed in the initial activity. It would 
never be optimal for a firm to allocate less than some epsilon to the new market. The firm must 
allocate sufficient capabilities into the new market such that it can establish competitive viability 
in this market. Furthermore, the firm must make sure the gains in the new market to which these 
capabilities are being applied is larger than the losses incurred by allocating these 
capabilities away from the old market. As a result, the best response curve always has a jump 
from zero at the point of diversification to some discrete magnitude.  
The second reason that the best response curves may not be continuous is that the best 
response curves have small jumps at the point where the competitor either makes a discrete move 
into or out of a product market in response to its competitor’s change in allocation of capabilities 
across markets. Note that this second reason for the best response curves not being continuous is 
also the reason why the best response curves are not monotonic (see Appendix 3 for an 
illustration of the above argument and some more detailed explanation). 
Even in the presence of the analytical challenges identified above, we are still able to 
derive the following propositions. To capture the change in relative demand, without loss of 
                                                                                                                                                             
model of Cournot competition. The first-stage decision variable is production capacity in Kreps and Scheinkman’s 
model, but in the context of our model it is the allocation of capabilities. The allocated capabilities determine the 
level of average cost in a given market (see equation (2) on p. 13). Also, in contrast to Kreps and Scheinkman 
(1983), we assume there is no constraint to production capacity and thus production capacity can scale up 
simultaneously with the output decision. Under this specification, the sequencing of the firms’ choice problem is 
that firms first choose their non-scale free capability allocations, which in turn determine firms’ cost level in each 
market. Second, given the chosen capability allocations and the associated cost levels, firms either choose their 
prices, if under the Bertrand competition, or choose production quantities, if under Cournot competition. The firm’s 
optimization problem can then be analyzed via backward induction. In sum, our model differs from Kreps and 
Scheinkman’s model in two important ways. First, Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) model examines only one 
market, while we model the allocation of capabilities across multiple markets along with diversification decisions. 
Second, Kreps and Scheinkman’s (1983) model examines Cournot competition assuming homogeneous firm 
capabilities, while our model examines how capabilities in each market are endogenously determined prior to 
Cournot competition.  
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generality, we hold constant the size of the initial market Ia  and only vary the size of the new 
market Na . Let 1 1 2 1 2( , , , , )N I IP P a T T t t  be firm 1’s profit function given the new market size 
Na , firm 1’s capability 1T , the competitor firm 2’s capability 2T , firm 1’s allocation 1It , and the 
competitor firm 2’s allocation 2It . Similarly, 2 2 1 2 1( , , , , )N I IP P a T T t t  represents firm 2’s profit 
function given the new market size Na , firm 2’s capability 2T , the competitor firm 1’s capability 
1T , firm 2’s allocation 2It , and the competitor firm 1’s allocation 1It . We use 
*
1It  and 
*
2It  to 
denote firms’ allocation in equilibrium. Given an initial setting ( 0Na  ) in which both firms 
compete in the initial market, we are able to state the following propositions: 
Proposition 2a: For 1, 2i  , there exists an ˆ 0, 0,and 0Na     , such that, when the 
size of the new market Na gets sufficiently large but not too large ( ˆ ˆN N Na a a    ) and the two 
firms’ capability asymmetry is small enough ( (3 )i iT T   ), there exists a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in which either firm may first diversify ( *(3 ) 1i It   ) while the other firm stays focused 
at the initial market ( * 1iIt  ). 
 
Proposition 2b: For 1, 2i  , fixing iT  as the less capable firm’s capability level, there 
exists a  0T  , 0Na 

, and 0   such that, when the size of the new market Na gets sufficiently 
large ( N N Na a a   
 
) and when the two firms’ capability asymmetry is sufficiently large 
( (3 )iT T  ), there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which only the more capable 
firm will first diversify ( *(3 )0 1i It   ) while the less capable firm stays focused at the initial 
market ( * 1iIt  ).  
 
Proposition 2c: For 1, 2i  , given Ia  as the size of the initial market and 3 iT  as the more 
capable firm’s capability level, there exists 0T   such that the firm without sufficient 
capabilities ( 0 iT T  ) will either focus on the initial market (
* 1iIt  ) or switch all resources 
from one market to the other ( * 0iIt  ) in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 (See Appendix 4 for proofs.) 
These three propositions highlight how firms’ diversification decisions differ when the 
size of the new market increases, depending on their capability asymmetry. Proposition 2a 
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highlights the role of competitive conditions being endogenous on the reallocation of resources 
across product markets. In this case, when one firm diversifies to take advantage of the new 
market opportunity, the current market becomes more attractive as the diversifying firm 
withdraws capabilities from this market. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium in which either 
the more capable firm or the less capable diversifies first while the other firm stays focused on 
the initial market.10 In addition, it is not an equilibrium for both firms to start diversifying 
simultaneously as the relative demand changes, even when these two firms have equal 
capabilities.  
However, while Proposition 2a provides a baseline result when firms are relatively 
symmetric, the core issue that is of primary interest to the strategy field is when firms are, to a 
significant degree, asymmetric in their capabilities. Proposition 2b demonstrates that with 
sufficient asymmetry in capabilities, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which the 
more capable firm diversifies first. In this case, for the more capable firm, the need to reallocate 
capabilities to the new market due to opportunity costs dominates the strategic consideration of 
waiting for the less capable firm to diversify first and thus alleviate competition in the initial 
segment.  
Proposition 2(c) indicates that a minimum amount of capabilities are necessary for the 
diversification strategy ever to be the optimal strategy, irrespective of relative demand conditions 
across alternative markets. When relative demand changes, the more capable firm goes through a 
diversification process; however, without sufficient capabilities, the less capable firm may never 
become diversified. It will focus on the initial market when the relative market size of the new 
                                                 
10  There could be two pure strategy Nash equilibria in Proposition 2a ( * *(3 )( 1,0 1)iI i It t    or 
* *
(3 )( 1, 0)iI i It t   ). 
However, in either case, Proposition 2a holds. Either firm can diversify first (diversify partly into the new market 
*
(3 )(0 1)i It   or completely switch to the new market 
*
(3 )( 0)i It   ), while the other firm stays focused in the initial 
market *( 1)iIt  . 
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market is small. When the relative market size of the new market gets larger, the less capable 
firm may completely switch to the new market but will never simultaneously engage both 
markets. This proposition further highlights the critical role of non-scale-free resources in 
determining the scope of the firm. 
In the following numerical analysis, we examine more fully the impact of asymmetry of 
capabilities on the diversification decisions and, in particular, the threshold of relative size of the 
new and the initial market that triggers diversification. In addition, we examine the impact on 
profit margins of diversification. This analysis not only generalizes Proposition 1 to the Cournot 
case, but it allows us to examine the cross-sectional implications of diversification behavior on 
the profit margins for firms with varying capability levels. 
  
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE INTERACTION  
For our numerical analysis, we set the baseline parameter values as follows: 10Ia , 
1 NI bb , scale-free capabilities 1  , and the fungibility of scale-free 
capabilities (1 ) 0.8  . In the subsequent analysis, we highlight the impact of varying levels of 
firm capabilities and market size ( Na , the size of the new market). This later variable allows us 
to capture relative demand maturity based on the increase in the size of the new market Na .
11 
Holding constant the new market and varying the initial market would lead to the same results. 
Implications of numerical investigation for diversification decisions 
In the Cournot analysis, we are able to analytically show that when two firms’ capability 
asymmetry is sufficiently large and the new market size is of sufficient size, the more capable 
                                                 
11 Note that while we keep scale-free capabilities  and their fungibility (1 ) in the model to stay connected with 
the existing literature, we do not explore these two parameters in the analysis since the focus of this paper is non-
scale free capabilities. See MacDonald and Ryall (2004: 1330-1331) and Adner and Zemsky (2008) for analytical 
examinations of scale-free capabilities and the effect of their fungibility on profitability. 
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firm will diversify first while the less capable firm stays focused on the initial market. Building 
on this property, we conduct the following numerical analysis to examine how the demand 
threshold to diversify changes with the degree of capability asymmetry. In so doing, we identify 
some interesting competitive effects of asymmetry in firms’ capabilities.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In Figure 1, Na  is the demand threshold where the more capable firm (with 
capabilities 1T ) first chooses to diversify, while the less capable firm (with capabilities 2T ) is still 
focused. The downward movement along a given curve captures the “capacity effect,” meaning 
that as the focal firm's own capabilities ( 1T ) increase, its threshold to diversify becomes smaller, 
or firm 1 reaches the threshold to diversify earlier. The shift in curves from square ( 2 1.5T  ) to 
diamond ( 2 0.5T  ) captures the “competition effect,” meaning that as the competitor's 
capabilities ( 2T ) decrease, the threshold for the more capable firm (with capabilities 1T ) to start 
diversifying becomes greater. This means that the more capable firm diversifies later (for a larger 
size of the new market), since the current market becomes more attractive.   
 
Implications of numerical investigation for profit margin and diversification  
 Having characterized diversification behavior under Cournot competition, we now 
address the central results regarding the impact of diversification on profit margins. In particular, 
the numerical analysis examines whether Proposition 1 regarding the tradeoff between total 
profits and profit margins holds under Cournot competition.  
 In Proposition 1, under the Bertrand setting, we compare the profit margin of a 
diversified firm with a hypothetical benchmark of the weighted average of the firm focusing 
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separately on the two markets. However, in the Bertrand setting, since there is essentially a 
single firm, we cannot make cross-sectional comparisons of firms with heterogeneous 
capabilities. The following analysis in the Cournot setting addresses this issue. With the same 
baseline parameter values of 10Ia , 1 NI bb ,1 0.8  , we let the more capable firm have 
capabilities 21 T  and the less capable one have capabilities 5.12 T .  
     ----------------------------------- 
   Insert Figure 2 about here 
 ----------------------------------- 
Examining profit margins as the size of the new market varies we see a number of 
interesting properties (Figure 2). First, consistent with Proposition 1, for both the more and less 
capable firm, there is a substantial drop in profit margin when the relative demand level in the 
new market passes the threshold sufficient to elicit diversification and market entry. Second, 
consistent with Proposition 2, given the significant heterogeneity in capabilities the first firm to 
diversify is the more capable firm. In the interim range of market demand for which it is optimal 
for the high-capability firm to diversify but for the low-capability firm to remain focused on the 
initial market, we see that the more capable firm may end up with a lower profit margin than the 
less capable firm.12 A firm’s rational diversification decision is driven by its pursuit of profit 
maximization rather than profit margin maximization. Thus, profit margin may not be a good 
proxy indicator for differences in capabilities among firms that vary in their degree of 
diversification.  
Another finding is that while both firms’ profit margins drop substantially when the 
relative demand level in the new market passes the threshold sufficient to elicit diversification, 
their profit margins will gradually increase as the relative demand grows further. Moreover, 
                                                 
12  Two working papers show a similar result by assuming multiple equal-sized markets that are perfectly 
competitive (Santalo, 2002) or monopolistically competitive (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). 
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when the demand level in the new market reaches a level sufficient for the low-capability firm to 
diversify as well, we see the cross-sectional property that one generally intuits that the more 
capable firm earns a higher profit margin.  
Finally, note that if the capability differences among the two firms is rather extreme, it 
may be the case that the more capable firm maintains a higher profit margin for all demand 
environments, even in that intermediate level of new market demand that generates 
diversification behavior on the part of the more capable firm but a focus on the original market 
on the part of the less capable firm. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this with: 10Ia , 
1 NI bb , 1 0.8  , 21 T , 5.02 T . 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND DIVERSIFICATION  
While the contemporary literature on diversification from a resource-based view builds 
upon the idea of excess firm capabilities developed in Penrose (1959), the emphasis has been on 
the fungibility of resources across domains. Making a clear analytical distinction between scale-
free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use 
or another helps to shift the discourse back to Penrose’s (1959) focus on the stock of 
organizational capabilities. The existence of non-scale free capabilities implies that profit- 
maximizing diversification decisions should be based on the opportunity cost of their use in one 
domain or another, which is in turn determined by the relative size of different market segments 
and the degree to which the effectiveness of capabilities diminishes across markets. We further 
identify the demand thresholds for firms to diversify as a function of their capabilities, which 
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allows us to infer the effect of heterogeneous capabilities on the order of diversification in the 
face of competitive interactions. The recognition of capabilities that must be allocated across 
multiple segments based on opportunity costs also provides a profit-maximizing explanation for 
the divergence between total profits and profit margins and in turn an alternative explanation of 
the diversification discount.  
Our developed model suggests an alternative self-selection mechanism that can account 
for the observation of a cross-sectional diversification discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang 
and Stulz, 1994). Firms with superior capabilities in a low-value existing market context enhance 
their profits by diversifying, but at the same time incur lower average return due to the spread of 
non-scale free capabilities across applications. Therefore, it may not be, as suggested by Gomes 
and Livdan (2004), that those firms with fewer capabilities (lower productivity) diversify first 
and this sorting of “bad types” into diversification events explains the observed cross-sectional 
diversification discount; rather, it could be that those firms with more capabilities diversify first 
and that this diversification activity decreases average returns.  
In this sense, our model can help reconcile the conflict between the existing self-selection 
explanations that rely on the assumptions of comparative productivity differences and 
diminishing returns to production scale (low productivity firms diversifying first) and the 
proposition well established in the strategy field that firms with more relevant capabilities tend to 
enter a new field earlier (e.g., Klepper and Simons, 2000; Mitchell, 1989). Critical to our 
argument is the opportunity cost of applying non-scale free capabilities in less favorable 
opportunities. Our argument suggests that diversifying firms are “good types” (i.e., high 
capabilities) operating in “bad” market contexts.  
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This argument suggests that a cross-sectional diversification discount may arise when 
firms participate in distinct niches in the same broadly defined industry. Different firms may 
experience different degrees of market maturity, and those operating in more mature sub-markets 
are more likely to diversify and do so earlier. Alternatively, a “generalist” firm (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) may respond to the demand maturity earlier by diversifying because it has 
greater exposure to the overall market conditions, while a “specialist” may not do so if its 
demand conditions are less affected by the overall market maturity. In either case, such profit-
maximizing diversifying firms suffer the triple blow of facing a less attractive demand 
environment with the decline in size of their original market, the diminished effectiveness of 
their capabilities as these capabilities are applied to related, but distinct, product markets, and the 
spreading of non-scale free capabilities across more segments. 
 The current theoretical model provides a conceptual basis for subsequent empirical 
analysis to sort out the different arguments regarding the self-selection mechanism in the 
diversification process. We make distinct empirical predictions from the existing corporate 
finance literature regarding which firms (more or less capable) are more or less diversified. 
Existing industry-level studies, such as Klepper and Simons’s (2000) work on the TV receiver 
industry, are broadly consistent with the arguments developed here. As commercial broadcasting 
began after World War II, the demand for TV receivers took off rapidly and attracted a flood of 
entrants (through 1989 a total of 177 US firms), many of which came from the radio industry. 
Klepper and Simons (2000) find that a greater degree of radio experience, measured by firm size, 
types of radios, and years of production, significantly increased the likelihood and speed of entry. 
Thus, radio producers appear to diversify into the TV receiver industry as a response to the 
growth of the TV market, and the relative maturity of the radio market; furthermore, if we 
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interpret more experience as evidence of more capabilities, then the results suggest that firms 
with more capabilities tend to diversify earlier.  
As a more general methodological note, it is worth observing that research on the 
relationship between prior experience/capabilities and entry based on a fine-grained industry 
classification is able to offer more refined measures of firms’ skills and capabilities than cross-
industry analysis that inevitably must rely on more coarse-grained data. Thus, the analysis that 
contrasts de novo entrants versus de alia entrants, such as Klepper and Simons (2000), Carroll et 
al. (1996), and Helfat and Lieberman (2002), offers an important window to a capability-based 
logic of diversification. Along these lines, more refined empirical analyses allow for measures of 
market demand that more closely correspond to the actual product market conditions that firms 
face. Even industry classification at the four-digit SIC level may incorporate many rather distinct 
submarkets with quite different demand patterns.13 This more refined sort of empirical analysis 
appears necessary to further unpack the critical elements of firm heterogeneity which results in 
firms being “sorted” into diversification activity. Is the sorting into diversification activity based 
on exogenous market maturity and a high level of non-scale free capabilities that have lost their 
value in their current application as suggested here; or is the differential sorting into 
diversification driven by low levels of firm capabilities and correspondingly relatively ex-ante 
weak performance as suggested by recent writings in the corporate finance literature (e.g., 
Gomes and Livdan, 2004)?  
                                                 
13 As an illustration of the heterogeneity within a four-digit SIC class, consider the cardiovascular medical device 
industry. Although this industry is mainly underneath primary SIC 3841 (surgical and medical instruments and 
apparatus) and 3845 (electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus), the relevant demand conditions for a given 
manufacturer are far more nuanced than a four-digit measure would provide because there exist eight independent 
product sub-markets, such as stents, pacemakers, and heart valves, that have experienced very different industry life 
cycles (Wu, 2009). 
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Identifying the crucial role of opportunity cost of resource allocation provides an 
alternative, economic-based explanation for the reluctance of established firms to aggressively 
enter new domains as identified by Christensen (1997) in the context of his work on the disk 
industry. The established firms in the disk drive industry faced a critical choice as to how to 
allocate their valuable product development teams in the face of brutal competition with rapid 
model introductions in their existing technological platforms or to introduce drives with an 
alternative format. Based on the relative size of the market for their current family of drives, as 
compared to the emerging market for smaller drives and ex-ante assessments of the growth rates 
of these alternative technologies, straightforward opportunity cost logic could argue for the 
apparent inertia of the established firms.  
The notion of opportunity cost is a powerful concept. Perhaps its basic and pervasive 
nature may cause us to ignore, or at least under-play, its role. Diversification is not merely driven 
by supply-side considerations of rare and distinctive resources, but is equally impacted by the 
market opportunities to which these resources may be applied. Ultimately, we need to develop 
explicit characterizations of these “supply side” dynamics of firms’ capabilities in conjunction 
with analyses of the competitive dynamics of product market competition. Both the investment 
in capabilities, as well as their allocation across contexts, is a function of firms’ perception of 
their demand environments and the competitive conditions they face. Recent work has rightly 
highlighted the endogeneity of diversification decisions. However, in capturing the basis of this 
endogeneity, it is important to leverage our existing insights regarding corporate diversification. 
The economic logic of the allocation of non-scale free capabilities over alternative domains 
builds on traditional capability-based views of the firm and provides a basis for endogenous 
diversification decisions consistent with existing and emerging empirical findings.  
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Table 1: Dimensions of capabilities 
 
 
Figure 1: Capability asymmetry and demand threshold 
 
 
Non-scale-free (positive 
opportunity cost)  
Scale-free (zero 
opportunity cost) 
Low 
fungibility 
High 
fungibility E.g., brand-name; 
computer 
operating system  
E.g., personnel 
with specific 
technical expertise; 
steel plant  
E.g., team of 
auditors; power 
generation 
equipment  
E.g., patent; 
customer 
relationship  
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Figure 2: Change in profit margin along with relative demand  
( 10Ia  , 1 NI bb , 1 2T  , 2 1.5T  , and (1 ) 0.8  ) 
 
Figure 3: Change in profit margin along with relative demand  
( 10Ia , 1 NI bb , 1 2T  , 2 0.5T  , and (1 ) 0.8  ) 
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APPENDIX 1 
In proving Proposition 1, we first solve the interior solution * *( , )I Nt t to the maximization 
problem (2) in the text when demand conditions are such that it is optimal for the firm to 
diversify:14  
NI
I
I
ss
s
t
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
)1(
)1(*
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
 and 
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N
N
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s
t
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)1(
*

  
Inserting * *( , )I Nt t into the profit margin of the diversification strategy 
* in equation (3) in 
the text, we can transform equation (3) as  
*
[ ( ) ( )] 2
(1 ) (1 )
I NNI
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Notice that the first term (in the square brackets) in the above equation is exactly the 
weighted average of two focus strategies in equation (4) in the text. Therefore, equation (5) in the 
text and thus Proposition 1 is proved. ■ 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that while competitors’ cost efficiency does not affect the continuous allocation of non-scale-
free capabilities to a certain segment in the Bertrand setting, it does influence the boundary conditions that 
determine whether a firm chooses to enter a segment. 
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APPENDIX 2 
The Tobin’s q associated with the diversification strategy is  
)( ** NI
NNII
DIV kkr
spsp
q


  
where capital in each market is respectively 
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Note that (i) if all capabilities are focused in the initial market, then capital is 
T
s
k
I
I
I 
 ; 
(ii) if all capabilities are focused in the new market, then capital is 
T
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I
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 . Therefore, 
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Therefore, the Tobin’s q associated with the diversification strategy can be transformed 
as: 
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 Next, we specify the weighted average of two focused strategies, with capital required 
when all capabilities are focused in one market, 
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Finally, we compare the Tobin’s q values associated with these two strategies by 
examining their ratio: 
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Therefore, there exists a discount factor 
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APPENDIX 3  
 
 
The above figure indicates the best response curves when relative demand conditions are 
such that both firms diversify in equilibrium. The solid line illustrates the reasons why firm 1’s 
best response curve is neither continuous nor monotonic. Firm 1’s best response curve has small 
jumps both when 2 It  is around 0.2 and 0.8. The “jump” around the value of 2 0.2It   stems from 
the fact that when 2 0.2It  , firm 2’s cost value is sufficiently high in the initial market that it is 
not able to produce in the initial market.  As a result, firm 1’s best response allocation of 
capabilities has a jump up as 2 It  increases and passes 0.2, because firm 2 begins to produce in 
the initial market. Similarly, when 2 0.82It  , firm 2’s cost is too high in the new market to be 
viable and produce a non-zero quantity.  As a result,  firm 1’s best response allocation of 
capabilities jumps up as 2 It  increases and passes 0.82, because at that point firm 2 exits 
participation in the new market and, as a result, firm 1 does not need to put so many capabilities 
into the new market.  
Similarly, the dotted line illustrates the reasons why firm 2’s best response curve is 
neither continuous nor monotonic. When 1 0.6It  , firm 2’s best response curve jumps from 0 to 
0.42. This jump stems from firm 2’s entry into the new market. In addition, Firm 2’s best 
response curve has a small jump when 1 0.1It  . This “jump” stems from the fact that 
when 1 0.1It  , firm 1’s cost value is sufficiently high in the initial market that it is not able to 
produce in the initial market. As a result, firm 2’s best response allocation has a jump up as 1It  
increases and passes 0.1, because firm 1 begins to produce in the initial market.  
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APPENDIX 4 
Note that to capture the change in relative demand, without loss of generality, for all the 
analyses, we hold constant the size of the initial market Ia  and only vary the size of the new 
market Na . Let 1 1 2 1 2( , , , , )N I IP P a T T t t  be firm 1’s profit function given the new market size Na , 
firm 1’s capability 1T , the competitor firm 2’s capability 2T , firm 1’s allocation 1It , and the 
competitor firm 2’s allocation 2 It . Similarly, 2 2 1 2 1( , , , , )N I IP P a T T t t  represents firm 2’s profit 
function given the new market size Na , firm 2’s capability 2T , the competitor firm 1’s capability 
1T , firm 2’s allocation 2 It , and the competitor firm 1’s allocation 1It . Note that 
1 2 1 2 1 1( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t     and 2 1 2 1 2 2( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t    , where,  
2( )im m imb q   and 
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i m
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a c
if q
b



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
 
 

  for 1,2; ,i m I N       (A1)  
 
Below we restate Proposition 2a by characterizing the properties of the best response 
curves. Moreover, without loss of generality, we fix the capability level of firm 1 and vary the 
capability level of firm 2 ( 2T T ). 
 
Proposition 2a: Let 2T T . There exists an ˆ 0, 0,and 0Na     , such that 
1 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  reaches maximum at some 1 1( , ) 1I Nt t a T   and 1 2 1( , , , , ( , ))N I NP a T T t t a T  has a 
unique maximum at 2 1It  ,  whenever ˆ ˆN N Na a a     and 1T T   . 
 
We start by proving when Na  is small enough, there is a unique equilibrium 
( 1 21, 1I It t  ), or both firms focus on the initial market. 
Lemma 1: Given any 1T  and 2T , there exists an Na  such that when NNa a , 1P  has a unique 
maximum at 1 1It   for all 2 It  and 2P  has a unique maximum at 2 1It   for all 1It . 
 
Proof: We provide the proof for 1P , and that for 2P  is analogous. Note that 1 0Nq   and thus 
2
1 1( ) 0N N Nb q    for all 2 It  whenever 1
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; in other words, firm 1’s marginal cost in the new market is 
always greater than the maximal possible price unless firm 1 allocates enough capability to the 
new market (i.e., 1
1
1
1
(1 )I N
t
a T 
 

). This result together with the fact that 1Iq  is strictly 
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increasing in 1It  on  
1
1
[1 ,1]
(1 )Na T 


 implies that 21 1 1 1 10 ( )I N I I IP b q         is strictly 
increasing in 1It  on 
1
1
[1 ,1]
(1 )Na T 


.  
Note that when c we have 1 0Nq   and hence that 
2
1 1( )I IP b q  is increasing in 1It  on [0, 
1] (since 1Iq  is increasing in 1It ). Thus, when 0Na  , 1P  has a unique maximum at 1 1It   for 
all 2 It . This result implies that there exists an Na  such that when NNa a 1P  has a unique 
maximum at 1 1It   for all 2 It , provided that 1P  is continuously increasing in Na  for 
1
1
1
[0,1 ]
(1 )I N
t
a T 
 

 and is constant with respect to the changes of Na  for 
1
1
1
[1 ,1]
(1 )I N
t
a T 
 

 (this later condition implies that 1P  is still strictly increasing in 1It  on 
1
1
[1 ,1]
(1 )Na T 


, as proved in the previous paragraph). ■ 
 
Lemma 1 immediately implies that when Na  is small enough, 1 2( , ) (1,1)I It t  , or both 
firms focusing on the initial market, is the unique equilibrium.  
 
We then prove that when the new market gets sufficiently large and two firms’ capability 
asymmetry is small enough, either firm may first diversify while the other stays focused at the 
initial market. 
 
 In so doing, we first prove a lemma to show that if it is optimal for firm 1 to choose 
1 1It   given some 2 It , it must be still optimal for firm 1 to choose 1 1It   given some 2 2I It t . 
That is, 
Lemma 2: 
2
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Lemma 2 follows because 
2
1
2 1
0I
I I
q
t t


 
 and 
2
1
2 1
0N
I I
q
t t


 
; 1 1
2 1
0I I
I I
q q
t t
 

 
 and 
1 1
2 1
0N N
I I
q q
t t
 

 
(Easy to check from equation A1). ■ 
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Therefore, if it is optimal to focus on the initial market when the competitor focuses on 
the initial market ( 2 1It  ), it must be still optimal to focus if the competitor diversifies into the 
new market. Similarly this lemma applies to firm 2.  
 
Lemma 3: Given 0T  , when the two firms have the same level of capabilities, that is 
1 2T T T  , there exists an ˆ 0Na   such that 1ˆ( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has at least two maxima including 
one at 1 1It  . 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique maximum at 1 1It   whenever ˆN Na a , and 
1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t reaches maximum at some 1 1 ( ) 1I I Nt t a   whenever ˆN Na a  . 
 
Proof: According to the argument in Lemma 1, it is easy to check that 1(0, , , ,1)IP T T t  is 
increasing in 1It  over [0,1] and is strictly increasing in 1It  when 1It  is close to 1. Thus, when Na  
is small enough, 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique maximum at 1 1It  . Also, it is straightforward to 
check that 1( , , , ,1) ( , , ,1,1)N I NP a T T t P a T T  for any 1 1It   when Na  is big enough. This result 
together with the fact that 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  is continuous in Na  implies that there exists a 
threshold ˆ 0Na   such that 1ˆ( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has at least two maxima including one at 1 1It  .  
Note that: 
2
1
1
( , , , ,1) 0N I
N I
P a T T t
a t


 
, which implies that 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique 
maximum at 1 1It   whenever ˆN Na a  and 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  reaches maximum at some  
1 1 ( ) 1I I Nt t a   whenever ˆN Na a . ■ 
 
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together imply the following corollary for all 2 1It  . 
 
Corollary 1: 1 2ˆ( , , , , )N I IP a T T t t has a unique maximum at 1 1It   for all 2 1It  . 
 
Now we can prove Proposition 2(a):  
 
 
Proof: Proposition 2a follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 3, and Corollary 1 and the fact that P  is 
differentiable with respect to all arguments. ■ 
 
Note that 1 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  reaches maximum at some 1 1( , ) 1I Nt t a T  . This maximum is 
not necessarily unique. There can be a unique maximum at 1 0It  , or a unique maximum 
at 10 1It  , or two maxima at both 1 0It   and some 10 1It  . However, in any case, 
Proposition 2a is proved in that, in equilibrium, either firm can diversify first (diversifies partly 
into the new market or completely switches to the new market) while the other firm stays 
focused in the initial market. 
 
Below we restate Proposition 2b by characterizing the properties of the best response 
curves. Moreover, without loss of generality, we let firm 2 be the less capable firm. 
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Proposition 2b: Fixing 2T , there exists a 
 0T  , 0Na 

, 0Na 

, N Na a
 
, and 0   
such that, when 1T T ,  
 i) 1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique maximum at 1 1It   for all N Na a

 
ii) 1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique maximum at some 10 1 It  for all ( , )N N Na a a  
 
,  and 
iii) 2 1 2( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique maximum at 2 1It   for all N Na a

 
 
Proof: It is straightforward to see that, for firm 1, there exists an 0Na 

 such that 
1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t

has a maximum at 1 1It   and a maximum at some 1 1It  . Similar to the proof 
of Lemma 3,
2
1 2 1
1
( , , , ,1) 0N I
N I
P a T T t
a t


 
, so 1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t has a unique maximum at 1 1It   
for all N Na a

, and 1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t reaches maximum at some 1 1It    for all ( , )N N Na a a  
 
 
(not necessarily unique, since there can be two maxima at both 1 0It   and some 10 1It  ). 
Moreover, 0Na 

satisfies 1 2 1 1 2( , , , ,1) ( , , ,1,1)N I NP a T T t P a T T
 
. That is, 
2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
9 4 9
I N I
I I
I N I
a a a
T t T t T T T
b b b
     
    
 
 

.  It is easy to check that Na

 
approaches zero as 1T  increases. In addition, as 1T  increases, 1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t

 has a unique 
maximum at some 10 1It  , since 1 0It   can never be a maximum when Na

 approaches zero. 
This fact implies that 1 2 1( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t  has a unique maximum at some 10 1It   for 
all ( , )N N Na a a  
 
. 
Similarly, for firm 2, it is straightforward to see that there exists an 0Na 

 such that 
2 1 2( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t

 has a maximum at 2 1It   and a maximum at some 2 1It  . 
Namely, 2 1 2 2 1( , , , ,1) ( , , ,1,1)N NP a T T t P a T T
 
. That is: 
2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
9 4 9
I N I
I I
I N I
a a a
T t T t T T T
b b b
    
    
 
 

.  
Since 
2
2 1 2
2
( , , , ,1) 0N I
N I
P a T T t
a t


 
, 2 1 2( , , , ,1)N IP a T T t has a unique maximum at 2 1It   for all 
N Na a

. In addition, it is straightforward to check that Na

 approaches a constant as 1T  increases. 
Since Na

 approaches zero as 1T  increases, N Na a
 
 when 1T  is large enough. Since 1P  is 
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continuously increasing in 1T  and 2P  is continuously decreasing in 1T , there exists a
 0T  ; for all 
N N N Na a a a   
  
, it is a unique equilibrium that 10 1 It  and 2 1It   when 1T T .■ 
Below we restate Proposition 2c by characterizing the properties of the best response 
curves. Moreover, without loss of generality, we let firm 2 be the less capable firm. 
 
Proposition 2c: Given Ia  and 1T , there exists 0T   such that for any 20 T T   and 
10 1It  , 1 2 1 2( , , , , )N I IP a T T t t  achieves maximum at 2 0It  or 2 1It  . 
 
Proof: Recall that the total profit of firm 2 is 2 1 2 1 2 2( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t    , where 
2
2 2( )m m mb q   and 
1 2
1
2
2
1
2
max( ,0) ,  0
3
max( ,0) ,            0
2
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m
a c c
if q
b
q
a c
if q
b
     

  for ,m I N  
Given that 1
1 1
1
I
I
c
t T
 , 2
2 2
1
I
I
c
t T
 , 1
1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )N I
c
t T 

 
, and 
2
2 2
1
(1 ) (1 )N I
c
t T 

 
, it is easy to check the following are true: 
1) 2 Iq  (and hence 2I ) is increasing in 2 It  and 2T . There exists 2 [0,1]
I
It  such that 2 0Iq   (and 
hence 2 0I  ) for all 2 2[0, )
I
I It t . The threshold 2
I
It  decreases in 2T  and equals 1 when 2T  is 
small enough. 2
I
It  does not change with Na . 
2) 2Nq  (and hence 2N ) is decreasing in 2 It , but increasing in 2T . There exists 2 [0,1]
N
It   such 
that 2 0Nq   (and hence 2 0N  ) for all 2 2( ,1]
N
I It t . The threshold 2
N
It  increases in Na  and 
approaches 1 as Na  approaches infinity. 2
N
It  is increasing in 2T . 
 
Therefore, there exists an 0Na  and a threshold ( ) 0NT a  such that 2 (0,1)
N
It   and 
whenever 20 ( )NT T a    we have 2 2
I N
I It t  (since 2
I
It  is decreasing in 2T  and 2
N
It  is increasing 
in 2T  as explained above) and 2 2 2 2( 1) ( 0)I I N It t     (since 2 2( 1)I It   is independent of Na  
while 2 2( 0)N It   is increasing in Na  as explained above). This fact implies that given any Ia , 
1T , and 1It , firm 2’s total profit 2 1 2 1 2 2( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t     achieves maximum at 2 0It  or 
2 1It   for all 0Na   whenever 2 ( )NT T a  . This result clearly holds when N Na a  , since, by 
the above definition of Na  and ( )NT a , 2 1 2 1 2 2( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t     achieves maximum at 
2 0It  . Next we prove this result for N Na a   and N Na a  respectively. 
When N Na a  , we have 2 2
I N
I It t , since 2
I
It  does not change with Na  and 2
N
It  increases 
in Na . Therefore, 2 1 2 1 2 2( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t     achieves maximum at 2 0It  or 2 1It   because 
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2 1 2 1 2 2( , , , , )N I I I NP a T T t t     is strictly decreasing in 2 It  on 2[0, )
N
It , is zero on 2 2[ , ]
N I
I It t , and is 
strictly increasing in 2 It  on 2( ,1]
I
It .  
When N Na a  , 2 1 1 2 2( , , ,0, ) ( , 0)N I N N IP a T T t a t   is strictly greater than 
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2( , , , , ) ( , ) ( )N I I N N I I IP a T T t t a t t   for any 2 (0,1]It  , because 
2 2 2 2 2 2( , 0) [ ( , ) ( )]N N I N N I I Ia t a t t      equals 2 2 2 2( , 0) ( , ) 0N N I N N Ia t a t     for all 
2 2(0, ]
I
I It t , and is greater than 2 2 2 2 2 2( , 0) [ ( , ) ( 1)] 0
I
N N I N N I I Ia t a t t        for 2 2( ,1]
I
I It t  
( 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , )
I
N N I N N Ia t a t  for 2 2( ,1]
I
I It t  since 2 2( , )N N Ia t  is decreasing in 2 It  for 
2 2( ,1]
I
I It t ; 2 2 2 2( ) ( 1)I I I It t    for 2 2( ,1]
I
I It t  since 2 2( )I It  is increasing in 2 It  for 
2 2( ,1]
I
I It t ).  
Note that 2 2 2 2 2 2( , 0) [ ( , ) ( 1)] 0
I
N N I N N I I Ia t a t t        is because 
2 2 2 2 2 2( , 0) [ ( , ) ( 1)]
I
N N I N N I I Ia t a t t       > 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , 0) [ ( , ) ( 1)] ( , 0) [0 ( 1)] 0
I
N N I N N I I I N N I I Ia t a t t a t t                , where the 
first inequality holds because 
2
2 1 2
2
( , , , ,1) 0N I
N I
P a T T t
a t


 
and N Na a  , the equality holds due 
to the definition of Na  (when N Na a  , 2 2
I N
I It t  and 2 2( , ) 0N N Ia t   for all 2 2( ,1]
N
I It t ), and 
the last inequality holds due to the definition of Na  and ( )
nT a .  
 
Therefore, ( )NT a serves as an upper bound such that, given Ia  and 1T , the total profit of 
firm 2 achieves maximum at 2 0It  or 2 1It   for any 20 ( )NT T a    and 10 1It  .■ 
 
